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Abstract: Excessive carbon emissions have posed a threat to sustainable development. An appropriate market-based low
carbon policy becomes the essence of regulating strategy for reducing carbon emissions in the energy sector. This study
proposes a Stackelberg game-theoretic model to determine an optimal low carbon policy design in energy market. To
encourage fuel switching to low-carbon generating sources, the effects of varying carbon price on generator's profit are
evaluated. Meanwhile, to reduce carbon emissions caused by energy consumption, carbon tracing and billing incentive methods
for consumers are proposed. The efficiency of low carbon policy is ensured through maximising social welfare and the overall
carbon reductions from economic and environmental perspectives. A bi-level multiobjective optimisation immune algorithm is
designed to dynamically find optimal policy decisions in the leader level, and optimal generation and consumption decisions in
the followers level. Case studies demonstrate that the designed model leads to better carbon mitigation and social welfare in the
energy market. The proposed methodology can save up to 26.41% of carbon emissions from the consumption side for the UK
power sector and promote 31.45% of more electricity generation from renewable energy sources.
1 Introduction
The global population will increase from 7 billion to 9 billion over
the next 40 years, with energy demand rising by 50% [1]. In the
energy sector, fossil fuels (including coal, gas, and oil) supply
around 80% of total energy demand [2]. This will still continue for
decades until renewable energy sources become the main energy
supplies. During the combustion of fossil fuels, enormous
quantities of carbon dioxide are emitted, which leads to global
warming and irreversible effects of climate change [3]. Facing
these climate issues, low carbon policy encourages generators to
switch fuels to renewable energy sources through increasing carbon
cost of fossil fuel-based power plants. Meanwhile, low carbon
policy needs to incentivise consumers to be aware of emission
differences caused by various consumption patterns and regions.
With smart grid technologies, generators and consumers are able to
bidirectionally communicate with energy markets [4], such that
policy-makers can adapt policies of energy market scheduling to
achieve low carbon targets.
The carbon price, as a market-based climate policy, is a primary
economic instrument to address carbon emissions caused by fossil
fuel-based generation in the energy sector [5]. However, an
inappropriate carbon price would inefficiently deliver low carbon
transition and emission targets, which is a challenge of most
current low carbon policies [6]. If the carbon price lies below the
estimates of social cost of carbon or the rates at which reduction
target will be realised, such as carbon price of EU emission trading
scheme, it fails to incentivise generators for low carbon transition
to renewable energy sources; if the carbon price is set too high, the
gap between high price entities and entities with low or without
carbon price would harm business competitiveness. The price gap
also results in a carbon leakage issue, which means that entities
will discharge emissions in the region with low carbon price but
overall emissions are not reduced [7]. To manage these
inappropriate carbon price issues, carbon price floor (CPF) and
ceiling are implemented in the current international carbon market
[8]. The UK CPF is set to compensate low carbon price of EU
emission trading scheme since 2013 [9]. New Zealand creates a
price ceiling through fixed price option [10]. The US regional
greenhouse gas initiative creates a carbon price corridor by setting
price floor and ceiling [11]. Nonetheless, these international
experiences have so far produced an insufficient carbon pricing
scheme to adequately incentivise low carbon energy transition. For
instance, after introducing CPF in the UK energy market, the
carbon price has been frozen at its floor price since 2015 and thus
renewable transition slows down [12]. One of the prime reasons of
this frozen carbon price is that the responding information from
energy market participants, i.e. generators and consumers, is not
dynamically grasped to adopt low carbon policy, and the
consumers are not involved in the policy design. This provides
opportunities for using game-theoretic strategy to design a dynamic
carbon price scheme to optimally interact between the policy-
maker and energy market participants, in particular energy
consumers.
The low carbon energy market scheduling refers to strategically
dispatching energy sources for generating electricity with the
objectives of carbon mitigation, costs saving, and electricity bills
reduction. The game-theoretic strategy is gaining increasing
attention as an analysis tool for scheduling and modelling
interactions in energy markets. Cournot and Stackelberg are two
classic models of game theory for energy market scheduling.
Cournot model describes that players make decisions
independently and simultaneously [13]. By contrast, Stackelberg
game-theoretic model features a hierarchical two-level decision-
making approach [14]. These two levels are leader level and
follower level according to the action sequence of players. The
leader makes decisions first and has an idea of actions for each
follower who makes subsequent decisions responding to the
leader's strategies [15]. During low carbon energy market
scheduling, policy-makers, including regulators and system
operators, formulate low carbon policy prioritising market changes
or responses from generators and consumers, so as to effectively
yield the largest social welfare [16]. This forms a sequential action
structure and therefore motivates us to utilise the Stackelberg
game-theoretic model. This model can seize heterogeneous
interactions of participants in low carbon energy market, and
evaluate the effectiveness of policy scheme by grasping responding
information from both generators and consumers.
With respect to related works of game-theoretic strategy,
Cintuglu et al. [17] designed a game-theory method to model the
operating cost, pollutant emissions, and cost of power exchange for
generators. Further works [18–20] extend the game-theoretic
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power system scheduling to involve the role of consumers. The
objective of consumers is to minimise their electricity payment
bills by managing them as a single unit [18], through aggregators
[20] or controlling appliances [19]. The research in [18] uses
carbon reduction as a shared objective function of generators and
consumers, but practically generators pay more attention to the rise
of cost due to purchasing carbon price and consumers preferably
adapt their consumption patterns to lower electricity bills. For this
reason, the game-theoretic interactions between generators and
consumers may not sufficiently deliver the low carbon target. The
role of the policy-maker is equally important for low carbon energy
market scheduling through policy incentives. A recent study for
carbon taxes design in the electricity sector [21] considers
interactions between the policy-maker and generators. Minimum
tax rates are decided to effectively achieve a carbon target. There
are still great opportunities in considering energy market
participants including generators, consumers, and policy-makers
together and applying policy measurement such as social welfare to
guarantee energy market efficiency.
Moreover, the carbon emissions incurred by consumption
patterns and locations may vary, which is a primary driver for
carbon emissions in the generation side. From policy-maker's
perspective, carbon accounting in consumers' level is necessary for
formulating appropriate monetary incentives for specific group of
consumers to change their consumption for carbon reduction. This
monetary compensation comes from the carbon tax received from
generators to realise tax neutralising. The method of carbon
accounting for consumers is explored in [22] as a concept of
carbon emission flow (CEF). The CEF is applied in power systems
as a network flow accompanying power flow in [23]. A similar
method is extended to a mathematical model in [24] for tracing,
calculating, and distributing onto each of consumers to analyse
carbon emission differences caused by consumption behaviours.
The matrix calculation of CEF is based on a known distribution of
optimal power flow. For the traditional optimal power flow which
is determined by the objective of minimising operating cost of
generators as proposed in [24], the CEF caused by consumers'
consumption patterns is well evaluated. However, the performance
of the CEF model may degrade when considering low carbon
scheduling of consumers, because both the power flow and CEF of
consumers are considered as decision variables, instead of only
mitigating carbon emissions with power flow distribution
unchanged. In addition, from a policy-maker's perspective, how to
use carbon tax to incentivise consumers' low carbon energy
consumption behaviours is missing in existing studies.
This paper approaches low carbon energy market scheduling to
solve the aforementioned issues considering several gaps in
existing studies. Instead of finding minimum tax rates in existing
studies, we design an optimal carbon price and compensation
scheme to fairly abate carbon emissions as much as below the
emission targets, whilst guaranteeing the maximisation of social
welfare brought by low carbon policy. From generators'
perspective, rather than focusing on fundamental costs (operation,
maintenance, and other financial costs), we couple emission
trading market with energy market by involving carbon cost. This
encourages decision making by generators between fuel switching
and purchasing carbon price. From the consumers' perspective,
although the carbon cost is charged to generators, they will pass
some of these carbon costs on as increased electricity bills for
consumers. However, consumers in high carbon intensity regions
and time periods are not incentivised. Our research adjusts
previous low carbon policy with compensation to accommodate the
demand side participation. Compared with the existing works, this
paper's contributions are
• This paper proposes a novel low carbon policy design by
dynamically setting optimal carbon prices and compensation
rates to combat the aforementioned issues brought by
inappropriate carbon prices. In contrast to existing studies on
carbon tax design which minimise tax rates while maintaining
carbon emissions below the targets, we use maximisation of
social welfare and carbon reduction to realise a trade-off
between market efficiency and carbon abatement.
• This paper extends existing low carbon power systems
scheduling model by involving the effects of low carbon policy
on consumers' payment bills and carbon cost of generators. This
extension contributes to enforce fuel-switching of generators
and demand side carbon abatement of consumers in specific
regions and time periods. The overall CEF and power flow are
scheduled as consumers and generators' decisions. This is
different from existing studies to calculate CEF based on known
optimal power flow.
• Optimal decisions of Stackelberg game-theoretic model are
obtained through the proposed bi-level multiobjective immune
algorithm (BL-MOIA). The BL-MOIA yields better
performances through evaluating followers' responding
strategies in a feedback way compared with original
multiobjective immune algorithm (MOIA) and other
deterministic algorithms.
• Case studies demonstrate that up to 26.41% of daily carbon
reduction in demand side can be realised through monetary
compensation scheme, and 31.45% of electricity generation
from renewable energy sources can be realised through
involving carbon price into generating costs. £ 4.51 m of daily
social welfare is created as additional benefits of the proposed
model.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2
introduces the low carbon energy market scheduling framework
and discusses the CEF model. The framework of the Stackelberg
game-theoretic model is described in Section 3. Section 4 describes
the solution techniques for Stackelberg game-theoretic scheduling.
Section 5 provides case studies to demonstrate the proposed model.
Finally, Section 6 draws the conclusions.
2 System model
In this section, the overall framework of low carbon energy market
scheduling is illustrated and the CEF method is then discussed as a
preliminary of Stackelberg game-theoretic model.
2.1 Low carbon energy market scheduling framework
The overview framework of low carbon energy market scheduling
is presented in Fig. 1. The electricity generation sources consist of
coal, nuclear, wind, combined cycle gas turbine (CCGT), hydro,
oil, open cycle gas turbine (OCGT), solar, and bioenergy. The
consumers are residential, commercial, and industrial users. The
proposed Stackelberg game-theoretic model primarily performs
two functions: (i) Before announcing finalised low carbon policy,
the proposed model provides an efficient tool for the policy-makers
to evaluate the potential policy impacts on generators and
consumers to obtain the optimal carbon price and monetary
compensation rates for carbon reduction; (ii) After announcing low
carbon policy, the proposed model provides an ancillary service for
the policy-makers to communicate with generators and consumers
through smart grid communication infrastructure, such that the
real-time decision variables including carbon prices, monetary
compensation, power generation and consumption can be optimally
decided.
The balancing and settlement code central services are an
existing IT system in the UK energy market as shown in the shaded
Fig. 1  Framework of low carbon energy market scheduling
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grey parts in Fig. 1. For the second function, the proposed model is
compatible with existing systems for transmitting additional
information of real-time CEF, carbon price, and monetary
compensation rate. The policy-makers including system operator
and regulator announce electricity price, carbon price, and
monetary compensation rate through the settlement administration
agent and distribute this information through communication lines.
The information of carbon emission caused by consumption, power
demand, electricity payment bill, and monetary compensation rate
for carbon reduction is bidirectionally transmitted between the
policy-maker and the consumer through home area networks and
neighbourhood area networks. Meanwhile, the information of
carbon emission caused by generation, power supply, generating
profit, and carbon price is bidirectionally transmitted between
policy-maker and generators. The data from generators and
consumers is collected by the central data collection agent and the
overall generation and consumption are aggregated by the supplier
volume allocation agent.
After data collection and aggregation, our proposed Stackelberg
game-theoretic model conducts low carbon energy market
scheduling through capturing the interactions among policy-maker,
generators, and consumers. Specifically, generators and consumers
in the followers level receive carbon price and monetary
compensation, respectively, from the policy-maker at the leader
level. Subsequently, generators seek to maximise their profits
considering carbon costs, while consumers seek to minimise their
payment bills with monetary incentives for carbon abatement in
high emission regions and time periods. The decisions of
generators (power generation) and consumers (power
consumption) are transmitted to the policy-makers as responding
strategies. The policy-makers dynamically adjust the carbon price
and monetary compensation rates by maximising social welfare
and carbon reduction.
2.2 Carbon emission flow
The goal of CEF tracing is to analyse potential differences in
carbon emissions caused by various electricity consumption
patterns and locations, as well as generation sources, before
formulating an efficient policy measure of low carbon energy
market scheduling for the overall power systems through
renewable energy utilisation and demand side management. To
trace the complete carbon footprint of power systems, a virtual
concept of CEF proposed by Li et al. [23] and Kang et al. [24] is
considered. In our paper, this model is extended to involve
electricity generation by major sources in specific power plant and
obtain optimal CEF distribution using Stackelberg game-theoretic
model considering policy incentivised fuel switching and demand
side management. We will first briefly discuss Kang's CEF model,
and the reader can refer to [24] for further details.
In power systems, power plants are represented by outflow
buses, substations with consumers are represented by inflow buses,
and transmission networks are represented by branches. The CEF
indicates a virtual network flow to trace the carbon footprint
flowing through power systems. Concurrent with the power flow,
the CEF is generated at outflow buses, before transmitted along the
branches into inflow buses. The CEF is implemented in overall
power networks and accumulated at consumer-side to quantify
carbon emissions through abstracting network features of
transmission branches. Hence, the carbon emission responsibility
for transmission and consumption sides can be fairly allocated,
instead of simply attributing emission responsibility to the
generation side. Although transmission and consumption are
unable to directly produce carbon emissions in reality, the power
generation and corresponding carbon emissions are primarily
driven by satisfying the demand of consumption side. To evaluate
the distribution and movement of CEF, two metrics are defined in
[24]
(i) CEF Rate: The CEF rate can be defined as the amount of CEF
in a point of power networks per unit of time with a unit of tCO2/h
R = dFdt , (1)
where R is the CEF rate, F is the CEF, and t is the time slot which
is defined as each hour of scheduling horizon in this paper.
1. ii) CEF intensity: The CEF intensity is defined as the amount
of CEF for a specific point of branch or bus per unit of active
power flow. It is used to describe the relationship between CEF
and power flow in power networks with a unit of tCO2/MWh
e = FE =
R
P , (2)
where e is the CEF intensity, E is the electrical energy with the
unit of MWh, and P is the active power with the unit of MW.
Consider a smart power grid and let N with size N denote
the set of outflow buses representing power plant, indexed by
the integer g. Each outflow bus g ∈ N consists of single or
various generation sources. Define ℳ with size M as the set of
inflow buses representing consumers, indexed by the integer k.
2.2.1 CEF of generators: The CEF of generators quantifies the
portion ejected from outflow buses into branches. This carbon
emission is produced by the combustion of fossil fuels. According
to (2), the CEF rate of gth power plant is the product of carbon
intensity and active power output
Rg = Pg ⋅ eg, (3)
where Rg, Pg, and eg are the CEF rate, active power, and CEF
intensity of gth power plant, respectively.
In our research, in order to incentivise the internal carbon
abatement of power plants through fuel switching, we extend the
CEF of generators to consider the electricity generation by major
sources. For a power plant with a single generation source, its CEF
intensity is determined by the carbon emission factor of fuel and
fuel consumption rate [25]. For a multi-source power plant, the
CEF intensity of outflow bus is determined by all the sources at
this node
eg = ∑
u = 1
Nu
Pg, u ⋅ eg, u / ∑
u = 1
Nu
Pg, u, (4)
where Nu is the number of sources in the gth power plant, Pg, u and
eg, u are active power output and CEF intensity of uth generation
source in gth power plant.
2.2.2 CEF of branches: The CEF of branches is a mix of CEF
from various outflow buses. The CEF intensity is the same across
any particular branch cross section. Due to the topology structure
of power networks, the power flow distribution and the relationship
between power inflow and outflow are based on proportional
sharing principle [26]. Relating this principle to the CEF tracing,
the distribution of how much CEF from a particular outflow bus
goes into a branch, and subsequently into a particular inflow bus
can be described. According to the proportional sharing principle,
the bus receives CEF from several sources in a given proportion
and distributes this CEF to each outflow in the same proportion.
Fig. 2. takes the bus z as an example. Z+ and Z− are the inflow and
outflow sets of branches of the bus z. The inflow power on the ith
branch and outflow power on the jth branch are Pi and Pj,
respectively. The generator active power output is Pg. Besides,
power consumption in bus z and power loss of branch can be taken
Fig. 2  Proportional sharing principle properties illustration
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as another outflow branch. Hence, we can use the proportional
sharing principle to describe the relationships between Pi, Ri and
Pj, Rj. Define Pi, j and Pg, j as shares of the power flow in the jth
branch which come from ith inflow and generator, respectively, we
have
Pi, j
Pj
= Pi/ ∑
i ∈ Z+
Pi + ∑
g ∈ z
Pg ; (5)
Pg, j
Pj
= Pg/ ∑
i ∈ Z+
Pi + ∑
g ∈ z
Pg . (6)
The CEF rate in the jth outflow branch Rj is the sum of the CEF
rate in the inflow set of branches and generator
Rj = ∑
i ∈ Z+
(Pi, j ⋅ ei) + ∑
g ∈ z
(Pg, j ⋅ eg), (7)
where ei and eg are CEF intensities of ith branch and generator,
respectively. Using (5) and (6), the CEF intensity ej of jth branch is
ej =
Rj
Pj
=
∑i ∈ Z+ (Pi, j ⋅ ei) + ∑g ∈ z (Pg, j ⋅ eg)
Pj
=
∑i ∈ Z+ (Pi ⋅ ei) + ∑g ∈ z (Pg ⋅ eg)
∑i ∈ Z+ Pi + ∑g ∈ z Pg
.
(8)
2.2.3 Carbon emission loss of branches: The carbon emission
loss of branches is incurred by transmission loss. The additional
power needs to be generated to balance transmission loss, which
causes additional carbon emissions. The carbon emission loss of a
specific branch is equal to the difference between inflow and
outflow of CEF at the end of branch. Since the carbon emission
loss of a branch can be taken as a load on this branch, the intensity
of emission loss is the same as the CEF intensity of branch el = ej.
The carbon emission loss rate of lth branch is
Rl = Pl ⋅ el, (9)
where Rl, Pl, and el are the carbon emission loss rate, power loss,
and carbon emission loss intensity of lth (l = 1, …, L) branch,
respectively.
2.2.4 CEF of consumers: The CEF of consumers is delivered
from branches into inflow buses and caused by electricity
consumption. Similarly, the CEF rate of the kth consumer is
Rk = Pk ⋅ ek, (10)
where Rk, Pk, and ek are the CEF rate, power consumption, and
CEF intensity of kth consumer, respectively. Since the active power
load is represented by an outflow branch, (8) can be also applied to
the CEF intensity of customers
ek =
∑i ∈ Z+ (Pi ⋅ ei) + ∑g ∈ z (Pg ⋅ eg)
∑i ∈ Z+ Pi + ∑g ∈ z Pg
. (11)
It can be observed from (11) that the CEF intensity of customers is
determined by all inflows from generators and branches. For this
reason, the CEF intensity of customers holds the key to determine
CEF intensities in overall power networks. Therefore, the
minimisation of CEF intensity of customers contributes to the
reduction of carbon emissions for the whole power system. In
addition, within a power network, both power flow and CEF are
conserved, which means that the total inflow and outflow of power
flow and CEF maintain a balance at any given time period t
(t = 1, …, T) as
∑
t = 1
T
∑
g = 1
N
∑
u = 1
Nu
(Pg, u ⋅ t) = ∑
t = 1
T
∑
k = 1
M
(Pk ⋅ t) + ∑
t = 1
T
∑
l = 1
L
(Pl ⋅ t); (12)
∑
t = 1
T
∑
g = 1
N
∑
u = 1
Nu
(Rg, u ⋅ t) = ∑
t = 1
T
∑
k = 1
M
(Rk ⋅ t) + ∑
t = 1
T
∑
l = 1
L
(Rl ⋅ t) . (13)
Therefore, the CEF relationship can be incorporated into the
Stackelberg game-theoretic scheduling model to find the optimal
CEF distribution. Unlike the Stackelberg game-theoretic
framework in [18, 21], which only considers the carbon emissions
caused by power generation, the proposed model provides a fair
low carbon energy market scheduling to involve the roles of
transmission and consumption.
3 Game theory framework
This section describes a mathematical representation of the
Stackelberg game-theoretic model for low carbon energy market
scheduling.
3.1 Objective of consumers
The objective of consumers is to minimise their payment bills
considering carbon reduction and the decision variable is their
electricity demand. With the CEF model, the carbon emissions
caused by time-varying and region-varying consumption
behaviours can be traced. From previous research, the marginal
carbon emissions of varying consumption behaviours are
determined by generation mix and market systems [27, 28]. Thus,
the goal is to design a monetary compensation scheme αk to reduce
the carbon emissions caused by time periods and regions with
higher carbon emission rates and consider this monetary
compensation as a manner of payment bills compensation.
To study consumers' responding strategies, the Stackelberg
game-theoretic model for consumption scheduling [18, 19] is
considered. In our paper, this model is extended to involve time-
varying and region-varying features of carbon emissions and
reduce the emissions in those time periods and regions with high
carbon intensities. We will first discuss the common payment bill
minimisation model in [18–20]. For analysing the responding
strategies of consumers and minimising overall payment bills of
them, the consumers are considered as an aggregated unit during
the optimisation process, which is the focus of [18]. The objective
of consumers is to minimise their payment bills as
min
Pk
∑
t = 1
T
∑
k = 1
M
(π ⋅ Pk ⋅ t) , (14)
where π is the electricity price during each time slot t.
Let us consider the monetary compensation for carbon
reduction of consumers. When the CEF rate of consumption after
responding to leader's strategy Rk is higher than or equal to that
before responding to leader's strategy Rk0, consumers will not
receive any monetary compensation. In contrast, when the carbon
emissions of consumption after responding to leader's strategy Rk is
less than that before responding to leader's strategy Rk0, consumers
will receive monetary compensation from the policy-maker. The
monetary compensation for carbon reduction at high CEF rate level
is higher than that at low CEF rate level. Hence, the relationship
between the monetary compensation and the CEF rate change can
be described as
Mk =
αk[(Rk0)2 − Rk2], Rk0 > Rk;
0, Rk0 ⩽ Rk,
(15)
where Mk is the received monetary compensation of consumer k for
carbon reduction, αk is the monetary compensation rate of
consumer k, and Rk0, Rk are the CEF rate of the consumer k before
and after deploying monetary compensation strategy, respectively.
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Proof: the carbon reduction at high CEF rate level will receive
more monetary compensation, which means that the monetary
compensation rate αk = dMk /dRk  linearly increases with the
amount of CEF rate reduction. The second-order derivative of (15)
(when Rk0 > Rk) with respective to Rk should be positive
d2Mk /dRk2 > 0. Thus, (15) implies the aforementioned monetary
compensation strategy.□
Therefore, the payment bill optimisation problem for the
consumption side is modelled as
Objective I: min. payment bills of consumers
min
Pk
∑
t = 1
T
∑
k = 1
M
[(π ⋅ Pk − Mk) ⋅ t] , (16)
s.t.
0 ≤ ∑
k = 1
M
Pk ≤ Pmax, (17)
where Pmax is the maximum capacity of power networks.
3.2 Objective of generators
The objective of generators is to maximise their profits which can
be described as the total revenue subtracting operating costs. The
decision variables of generators are electricity generation by major
sources. For Stackelberg game-theoretic model of generation
scheduling in [18], the carbon reduction is taken as a shared
objective function of both generators and consumers, but the cost
of carbon emissions is not included in the generating costs.
Nonetheless, in a practical case, instead of seeking for carbon
reduction, generators pay more attention to the increase in cost due
to purchasing carbon price. In order to involve the cost of
purchasing carbon price for generators under emissions trading
scheme, the concept of clean spread is introduced [29] in our
model. This concept quantifies the profits of power sources from
selling a unit of electricity and adjusts the fundamental costs
(operation, maintenance, and other financial costs) by setting aside
carbon cost. In this concept, the clean dark spread refers to the
profit for coal-fired power plant and the clean spark spread refers
to the profit for gas-fired power plant. The climate spread describes
the profit difference between dark spread and clean spark spread
[30]. Rather than only considering the emission difference between
coal and gas, in our model, this concept is extended into electricity
generation by all the renewable and non-renewable sources.
For the clean renewable spread
Sr = ∑
g = 1
N
∑
u = 1
Nre
(π − Cg, u − β ⋅ eg, u); (18)
For the clean non-renewable spread
Sn = ∑
g = 1
N
∑
u = 1
Nnre
(π − Cg, u − β ⋅ eg, u), (19)
where Sr and Sn are clean renewable and non-renewable spreads,
respectively, Nre and Nnre are number of renewable and non-
renewable sources, respectively, β is the carbon price per ton of
carbon emissions and Cg, u is a fundamental cost of source u in gth
power plant and is evaluated by the levelised cost of electricity
(LCoE) generation, which is a measurement standard by the UK.
Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy [31]. The
LCoE for a specific source is the ratio of the total costs of a source
(including capital and operating costs) to the total amount of
electricity generation over the entire lifetime of this source. When
compared to today's costs and generation, future values are
discounted. Additionally, wider costs which partly fall to others
such as system balancing cost and carbon cost are not included in
this research, because LCoE only relates to the costs accruing to
the owner of the generation asset. The data regarding generation
sources is gathered including capital expenditures, operating
expenses, and expected generation, before calculating the sum of
net present value of total expected costs for each year and the sum
of net present value of expected generation for each year to
calculate LCoE as
Cg, u =
Ncg, u
Npg, u
= ∑
a
capexg, ua + opexg, ua
(1 + ζ)a
/∑
a
Pg, ua
(1 + ζ)a
. (20)
where Ncg, u is net present value of the expected cost of generation
source u at gth power plant, a is accounting year, capexg, ua  is capital
expenditures at the year a, opexg, ua  is the operating expense at year
a, Npg, u is net present value of expected electricity generation by
source u, Pg, ua  is net electricity generation at year a, and ζ is the
discount rate.
The profits optimisation problem for generators is modelled as
Objective II: max. profits of generators
max
Pg, u
∑
t = 1
T
∑
g = 1
N
∑
u = 1
Nu
[(Sr + Sn)Pg, u ⋅ t] , (21)
s.t.
Pg, umin ≤ Pg, u ≤ Pg, umax, (22)
where Pg, umin and Pg, umax are the minimum and maximum power
outputs of the source u at gth power plant. In addition, the
conservations of power flow and CEF (12) and (13) hold as the
generators' constraints.
Therefore, when considering the fundamental cost of generation
plus the cost of compliance with carbon policy, the internal carbon
abatement will be caused by electricity generation fuel switching.
In our simulations, the proposed objective of generators is
compared to the objective in [18] which minimises the fundamental
costs of generators.
3.3 Objective of policy-maker
In contrast to low carbon power system scheduling in [21], in
which the policy-maker seeks to minimise the tax rate (min β)
while maintaining that the total carbon emissions are lower than
the emissions target, our research introduces the social welfare as a
measurement of low carbon policy. This is because the true target
of low carbon policy is using market mechanism to deliver an
efficient level of carbon reduction, in which the carbon emission is
abated as much as possible without detrimental effects on energy
market efficiency such as energy price imbalance [32]. Thus, one
of the policy-maker's objectives is to maximise social welfare
brought by low carbon policy. Another objective is to maximise
carbon reduction. The decision variables of policy-makers are the
carbon price and the monetary compensation rates.
3.3.1 Maximisation of social welfare: The social welfare in this
paper is defined as the difference between benefits and costs
brought by low carbon policy. The economic benefits of low
carbon policy are the improvement of market surplus plus policy
maker's revenue through emission trading as (23). The market
surplus consists of the gain of generators' profits and the saving of
consumers' payment bills. The benefit of policy-maker's revenue is
created by revenue neutrality through investing in low carbon
technologies or compensate for other sector of the economy.
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B = ∑
t = 1
T
∑
g = 1
N
∑
u = 1
Nu
[(Sr + Sn)Pg, u ⋅ t − (π − Cg, u)Pg, u0 ⋅ t]
+ ∑
t = 1
T
∑
k = 1
M
[π ⋅ Pk0 ⋅ t − (π ⋅ Pk − Mk) ⋅ t]
+ ∑
t = 1
T
∑
g = 1
N
∑
u = 1
Nu
(β ⋅ eg, u ⋅ Pg, u ⋅ t),
(23)
where B is the economic benefits of low carbon policy, Pk0 is the
power consumption of consumer k before responding to low carbon
policy and Pg, u0  is the power output of producer u in gth generator
before responding to low carbon policy. The first term corresponds
to the improvement of overall profits of generators, the second
term corresponds to the reduction of overall payment bills of
consumers, and the third term corresponds to policy-maker's
revenue through emission trading.
The cost of low carbon policy is the monetary compensation for
consumers ∑t = 1
T ∑k = 1
M (Mk ⋅ t). Therefore, the social welfare
maximisation problem for policy-maker can be described as
Objective III: max. social welfare
max
αk, β
B − ∑
t = 1
T
∑
k = 1
M
(Mk ⋅ t) , (24)
s.t.
0 ≤ β ≤ βmax, (25)
0 ≤ αk ≤ αmax, (26)
where βmax and αmax are the maximum levels of the carbon price
and monetary compensation rate, respectively. Equations (25) and
(26) corresponds to the leader's strategy space for carbon price and
monetary compensation, respectively.
3.3.2 Maximisation of carbon reduction: The second objective
of the policy-maker is to mitigate the total carbon emissions for the
purpose of low carbon energy market development through
following measures: (i) reduce the carbon emissions caused by
electricity generation; (ii) facilitate the renewable obligation to be
performed by generators through increasing the penetration of
renewable power sources. From the first perspective, the objective
of policy-maker is to promote the reduction of overall CEF rate for
power systems as
Objective IV: max. carbon reduction
max
Pg, u
∑
t = 1
T
∑
g = 1
N
∑
u = 1
Nu
[(Pg, u0 − Pg, u)eg, u ⋅ t] . (27)
From the second perspective, the policy-maker regulates the
percentage of renewable power sources penetration as a constraint
of power generation dispatch
∑t = 1
T ∑g = 1N ∑u = 1
Nre (Pg, u ⋅ t)
∑t = 1
T ∑g = 1N ∑u = 1
Nu (Pg, u ⋅ t)
≥ γ, (28)
where γ is the minimum percentage of renewable energy
penetration regulated by the policy-maker.
4 Solution techniques
4.1 Problem formulation
The interaction among policy-maker, generators, and consumers
are modelled as a 1 – leader, 2 – follower Stackelberg game. The
leader's strategies are the carbon price β and monetary
compensation rate for kth consumer αk within the strategy spaces
(25) and (26), respectively. By contrast, the strategy of followers
representing consumers is electricity demand Pk within strategy
space (17) and the strategy of followers representing generators is
electricity generation by major sources Pg, u within strategy space
(12), (13) and (22). The leader's objective function of maximisation
of social welfare (24) is represented by JL1 β, αk, Pk, Pg, u . The
leader's objective function of maximisation of carbon reduction
(27) is represented by JL2 Pk , which is the leader's selfish objective
function within constraint of (28). The followers' objective
functions for consumers (16) and generators (21) are represented as
JK αk, Pk  and JG β, Pg, u , respectively. Steps to solve this
Stackelberg game-theoretic model are illustrated as
Step 1: Given leader's strategies β and αk within the strategy spaces
(25) and (26), the followers of consumers and generators try to
optimise their own objective functions within their strategy spaces
(12), (13), (17) and (22) to obtain optimal responding strategies
(i.e. optimal electricity demand Pk∗ and optimal electricity
generation by major sources Pg, u∗ ), respectively. After examining
every leader's feasible strategy, the followers' optimal responding
strategies Pk∗ and Pg, u∗  form the sets of optimal responding strategies
UK and UG, respectively.
Step 2: Based on each of the identified optimal responding
strategies in the sets UG and UK of generators and consumers, the
leader tries to optimise its objective functions (24) and (27). After
examining followers' responding strategies, the leader's optimal
strategies β∗ and αk∗ form the set of leader's optimal strategies UL.
Step 3: The set of leader's optimal strategies UL is taken as an
updated leader's strategies for the followers to optimise their own
objective functions. Through iterations between leader level and
followers level, the convergence is realised as Nash equilibrium of
Stackelberg game-theoretic model.
4.2 Benchmark forecasting
An optimal policy-making process is built on a precise forecasting
of current power generation and consumption. Aforementioned Pk0,
Pg, u0  need to be accurately predicted as benchmarks for low carbon
energy market scheduling to avoid the deviation of optimal policy
from realistic situations. Rk0 can then be calculated based on Pk0. In
power supply side, the prices of coal, smokeless fuels, and heating
oils are considered as impact factors of Pg, u0 . In power demand side,
average temperatures and electricity prices are considered as
impact factors of Pk0. The relationship between forecasting
objectives and impact factors is described through linear regressive
functions in generation and consumption sides, respectively [33].
Denote x and y as correlated random variables representing impact
factors and forecasting objectives, respectively, such that their
dependency is expressed as
y(t) = η0 + η1x1(t) + ⋯ + ηuxu(t), (29)
where y(t) is the value of forecasting objectives at time t, xu(t) is
the value of uth impact factor at the time t, and ηu is the
corresponding regression coefficient which is estimated through
evaluating the minimum squared difference between the estimated
value y^(t) and actual value y(t) as [34]
min
η̂u
∑
t = 1
T
ε2(t) = min
η̂u
∑
t = 1
T
[y(t) − y^(t)]2, (30)
where ε is the estimation error between the estimated value and
actual value.
Furthermore, considering the stochastic fluctuation of impact
factors, randomness and uncertainties need to be introduced in the
forecasting process. Unlike the uncertainty model in [35] which
employs parametric estimation to establish the distribution of
uncertain variables, we use kernel density estimation [36] as a non-
parametric estimation to estimate the probability density function
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(pdf) of uncertain impact factors. Kernel density estimation is
capable of precise estimation because it is directly generated from
historical observation without any assumption of parameters.
Furthermore, the randomness of impact factors is introduced
through Latin hypercube sampling [37]. Compared with the Monte
Carlo method [38], the Latin hypercube sampling is able to avoid
overconcentration issue through space-filling, which means that the
samples are generated over entire feasible range of uncertain
impact factors. Besides, the Monte Carlo method requires
relatively longer computing time because of slow convergence.
x1, x2, …, xi represent ith sample of impact factors, and f (x) is
corresponding density function for each sample. For sample xi,
i = 1, …, n acquired from historical observation with an unknown
density function, the density function is obtained through
f
^(x) = 1i ⋅ h ∑i = 1
n
K
x − xi
h , (31)
where f
^(x) is the estimated kernel density function, n is the number
of samples, h is the bandwidth smoothing parameter, and K( ∙ ) is
the kernel density function. In our research, the formula of the
Gaussian kernel is used due to relatively high efficiency and simple
mathematical presentation [39]. After combining kernel functions
generated from a specific sample point, the kernel density function
is acquired. The cumulative distribution function of x is
represented by Φ(x). Assume the desired sample size is Q. The
range Φ(x) is equally divided into Q intervals with the same
probability of 1/Q. Subsequently, a value is randomly selected at
each interval to generate samples. The qth (q = 1, …, Q) sample x
can be calculated by Φ−1, where Φ = 1/Q rn + q − 1 /Q , and
rn ∼ N(0, 1) is a random variable being subjected to uniform
distribution.
4.3 Algorithm
For the follower's level objective functions, due to the monetary
compensation (15) is a piecewise function, the objective function
of consumers becomes non-convex. Existing deterministic
methods, such as gradient-based algorithms and non-linear
programming, are liable to obtain sub-optimal solutions. This issue
will be demonstrated in our case studies. Thus, this motivates us to
utilise an intelligent algorithm to find the global optimal solutions,
which exist in different dimensions of objective functions. In
addition, objectives at leader level and followers level lead to their
own multiobjective optimisation problem (MOP). Chiu et al. [40]
proposed an MOIA to solve the MOP [40]. Nonetheless, the
iteration optimisation between leader level and followers level
cannot be modelled by original MOIA, which means that the
responding strategies from followers cannot be evaluated by the
leader in a feedback way. Therefore, we extend original MOIA to
an iterative BL-MOIA to solve this MOP. The solution is obtained
by using the leader-level BL-MOIA as shown in Algorithm 1 (see,
Fig. 3) and follower-level BL-MOIA as shown in Algorithm 2 (see,
Fig. 4). The flowchart of solving this Stackelberg game model is
shown in Fig. 5. Calculations of fitness value and clone rate, and
detailed algorithm refer to the work of Chiu et al. [40].
Furthermore, the Pareto optimality is introduced in order to
discuss the characteristics of the algorithm
 
Definition 1: (Pareto dominance): Define u and v as two
individual points in the evolutionary population, and f o as the
objective function. In the decision variable space, a point u
dominates another point v (denoted by u ⪰ v) when the condition
f o(u) ≤ f o(v) holds true and at least one inequality is strict.
 
Definition 2: (Pareto optimal solution): In the decision variable
space, if a point u is feasible and no other feasible points dominate
it, u is Pareto optimal solution.
 
Definition 3: (Pareto optimal set and Pareto front (PF)): All
pareto optimal solutions form the pareto optimal set. The image of
pareto optimal set through the objective functions f o is PF.
Fig. 3  Algorithm 1 leader-level BL-MOIA
 
Fig. 4  Algorithm 2 follower-level BL-MOIA
 
Fig. 5  Flowchart of solving Stackelberg game model
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5 Case studies
Case studies have been conducted to demonstrate the performance
of the proposed model based on the current UK power system and
energy market operations at one-hour intervals. Benchmark
forecasting on generators and consumers is performed through
using the UK historical data from National Statistics [41] from
2015 to 2017 at one-hour intervals. The UK government
announced in the 2017 Energy Review that the proportion of
renewable penetration will increase each year until 2020 from a
15.4% requirement in 2015–2016, up to 20% by 2020–2021 [42].
This target is also applied in this study as a constraint of renewable
percentage. The hourly wholesale electricity price in the UK
national grid is used as electricity price [43]. According to the EU
historic carbon price [44], the constraint of carbon price is set
between £ 0/tCO2 and £ 50/tCO2. The case studies are conducted
by Matlab on an Intel 3.20 GHz processor.
5.1 Distribution of CEF and monetary compensation rates
Proposed Stackelberg game-theoretic model is applied with the
IEEE 30-bus test system and the IEEE 118-bus test system to
compare the CEF and monetary compensation rates caused by
different network complexities. The IEEE 30-bus test system
consists of six generators, 41 branches, and 21 buses carrying
loads, while the IEEE 118-bus test system consists of 54
generators, 186 branches, and 99 buses carrying loads [45]. Each of
six generators in the IEEE 30-bus test system is allocated as single
or multiple types of energy sources depending on system default
capacities, and each of 54 generators in IEEE 118-bus test system
is allocated as a single type of electricity source in circular
sequence, as presented in Table 1. The cost and carbon emission
coefficients are calculated by the levelised values of project
commissioning in 2016 [31].
The chromatograms in Fig. 6 (IEEE 30-bus test system) and
Fig. 7 (IEEE 118-bus test system) present (aand d) the CEF of
branches, (b and e) carbon emission loss of branches, and (c and f)
CEF of consumers, (a, b and c) before and (d, e and f) after
scheduling. The corresponding monetary compensation rates for
(a) IEEE 30-bus test system and (b) IEEE 118-bus test system are
presented in Fig. 8. Each column denotes the distribution of CEF
and monetary compensation rates in overall power networks for a
given hour. The dark blue colour represents a lower value whereas
the bright yellow colour represents a higher value. As shown in
Figs. 6 and 7, although the overall distribution at different power
network topologies in each column varies, the trend of daily carbon
distribution in each row is similar. It can be seen that through
scheduling, extreme high CEF of consumers, branches, and carbon
emission loss of branches at specific bus or branch can be
mitigated. The scheduling presents a neutralised effects of carbon
emission for overall power networks and time horizon. The
monetary compensation rates also vary corresponding to CEF rates.
The darkest blue colour means that monetary compensation rates
are near zero, which is caused by either very low CEF rates or the
CEF rates after scheduling are higher than or equal to the ones
before scheduling, as indicated in (15).
After low carbon energy market scheduling, the daily overall
CEF of consumers in IEEE 30-bus test system reduces by 25.47%
(from 126.59 to 94.35 ktCO2), while that in IEEE 118-bus test
system reduces by 26.41% (from 137.34 to 101.07 ktCO2). This
illustrates the potential for consumption side carbon reduction of
our model. During real-time energy market operation, if the
information of CEF, power consumption, electricity payment bills
and monetary compensation can be dynamically transmitted to
consumers at specific bus through smart meters and smart grid
communication, the carbon footprint incurred by the time-varying
and region varying consumption behaviours would be captured.
Consumers can subsequently adjust their behaviours according to
our model-suggested optimal consumption.
5.2 Characteristics of solution techniques
5.2.1 Pareto optimal of leader and followers: For
demonstrating clarity, the following case studies use IEEE 30-bus
test system only. The PF of the trade-off between generating profits
of generators and electricity payment bills of consumers in
followers level is presented in Fig. 9a. The PF of trade-off between
social welfare of low carbon policy and carbon reduction effects in
leader level is presented in Fig. 9b. We select one-hour
optimisation as an example and compare the solution of BL-MOIA
with original MOIA which optimises leader level and followers
level objective functions simultaneously without iterations between
leader and followers. It can be seen that the PF in followers level is
in non-convexity. With the existing deterministic methods such as
gradient-based algorithms, the sub-optimal solutions may be
obtained. When the gradient-based algorithm falls at convex region
B instead of global optimal region A as shown in Fig. 9a, a
suboptimal solution will be found. Regarding both leader and
followers' objective functions, the proposed BL-MOIA yields
better performance than original MOIA through iterations between
leader and followers regarding both leader and followers' PF. The
convergence of BL-MOIA for (a) carbon price, (b) social welfare,
and (c) carbon reduction are presented in Fig. 10. The BL-MOIA
converges to optimal solutions within 50 iterations, although the
iterations between leader level and followers level are involved.
Table 1 Model coefficients
Source Generator
30-bus
Generator 118-bus LCoE,
£/MWh
CEF
intensity,
ton/MWh
coal G1, 2 G1, 10, 19, 28, 37,
46
134 0.870
nuclear G3, 4, 6 G2, 11, 20, 29, 38,
47
93 0.016
wind G1, 4 G3, 12, 21, 30, 39,
48
82 0.011
hydro G3 G4, 13, 22, 31, 40,
49
126 0.020
oil G2 G5, 14, 23, 32, 41,
50
160 0.650
OCGT G2 G6, 15, 24, 33, 42,
51
162 0.487
CCGT G2, 5 G7, 16, 25, 34, 43,
52
66 0.487
solar G6 G8, 17, 26, 35, 44,
53
80 0.041
bioenergy G6 G9, 18, 27, 36, 45,
54
87 0.230
 
Fig. 6  Distribution in IEEE 30-bus test system for
(a) CEF of branches before scheduling, (b) Carbon emission loss of branches before
scheduling, (c) CEF of consumers before scheduling, (d) CEF of branches after
scheduling, (e) Carbon emission loss of branches after scheduling, (f) CEF of
consumers after scheduling. The x-axis denotes the time of day (h) and y-axis denotes
the number of nodes or branches. The colour indicates the CEF level for each node or
branch for a given hour period. The unit of the colour bar is ktCO2
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5.2.2 Benchmark forecasting: To evaluate the performance of
benchmark forecasting methods, we compare our designed
benchmark forecasting method with linear regression method. The
mean absolute percentage error (MAPE) is used as a performance
metric, which defines the accuracy as
MAPE = 1n ∑i
yi − y^i
yi
. (32)
Through involving randomness and uncertainties, the average
MAPE of benchmark forecasting is 1.90%, lower than
conventional linear regression (2.60%). An example of forecasting
demand comparison in 150 h horizon is presented in Fig. 11. 
5.3 Low carbon energy market scheduling
We first compare our proposed Stackelberg game-theoretic model
with existing methods for energy market scheduling. At the
followers level, our model is transformed to the existing model as
[18, 19] by removing carbon costs and monetary compensation (let
β ⋅ eg, u = £0/MWh, and Mk = £0/tCO2). At the leader level, the
objective functions of leader are replaced by constraint of emission
target as [21]: Pg, u ⋅ eg, u ≤ Emax, where Emax is the carbon emission
target. We assume that the carbon reduction target is 5% of
benchmark carbon emissions. Next, we compare our proposed
model with the UK current carbon price from CPF through setting
Fig. 7  Distribution in IEEE 118-bus test system for
(a) CEF of branches before scheduling, (b) Carbon emission loss of branches before
scheduling, (c) CEF of consumers before scheduling, (d) CEF of branches after
scheduling, (e) Carbon emission loss of branches after scheduling, (f) CEF of
consumers after scheduling. The x-axis denotes the time of day (h) and y-axis denotes
the number of nodes or branches. The colour indicates the CEF level for each node or
branch for a given hour period. The unit of the colour bar is ktCO2
 
Fig. 8  Distribution of monetary compensation in
(a) IEEE 30-bus test system, (b) IEEE 118-bus test system. The x-axis denotes the
time of day (h) and y-axis denotes the number of nodes. The colour indicates the
monetary compensation level for each node for a given hour period. The unit of the
colour bar is £
 
Fig. 9  PF of trade-off between
(a) Profits and payment bills in followers level, (b) Social welfare and carbon
reduction in leader level. The circles are points found by BL-MOIA, and the crosses
are points found by MOIA
 
Fig. 10  Convergence of BL-MOIA for
(a) Carbon price, (b) Social welfare, (c) Carbon reduction
 
Fig. 11  Comparison of forecasting methods. This figure takes demand in
each hour as an example to compare forecasting accuracy
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β = £30/tCO2, and Mk = £0/tCO2 as [5]. The comparison of
electricity generation by major sources and average carbon
intensity for (a) benchmark, (b) proposed model, (c) existing
model, and (d) the UK CPF is presented in Fig. 12. It can be seen
that through either low carbon scheduling or CPF, daily carbon
emissions are halved compared to benchmark. The carbon target
set in existing method presents almost the same carbon mitigation
effects as CPF to drive fuel switching from fossil fuel-based
generations to renewables, notably from coal and CCGT to wind
and hydro energy. The CPF and carbon target maintain a fixed
carbon price or proportion of reduction such that the reduction
effects keep the same irrespective peak time or off-peak time
periods, while our proposed model strikes a more dramatic carbon
mitigation in peak time period from 15 to 19 h, because it realises a
higher proportion of renewable energy sources (average 31.14%
compared to average 28.31% of existing methods and average
28.79% of CPF) during peak time. In addition, the comparison of
daily total values of objective functions is presented in Table 2. 
The proposed model obtains better results in all dimensions,
notably creates £ 4.51 m of social welfare as additional benefits,
compared to £ 2.91 m of existing method and £ 1.13 m of CPF. The
scheduling also drives the payment bills down for consumers and
improves operating profits for generators. The aforementioned
climate spread within generators' objective will cause internal
carbon reduction of generators through generation source
switching. A power plant with non-renewable sources will either
have to reduce emissions internally or increase cost of purchasing
more carbon allowances. From environmental and economic
perspectives, the proposed model guarantees the trade-off between
market efficiency and carbon abatement.
With respect to long-term effects of the proposed model, we
compare the annual percentage of electricity generation by major
sources for benchmark, proposed model, existing model, and the
UK CPF as Fig. 13. The proposed model realises the highest
proportion of renewable energy sources (31.45%), whereas the
CPF (29.47%) fails to deliver the 30% of the UK carbon emission
target in 2030 [5].
6 Conclusion
To mitigate carbon emissions and manage the inappropriate carbon
price issue, this paper considers a low carbon policy design for
energy market scheduling under smart grid environment. This
design is different from current low carbon policies and energy
market scheduling methods by proposing a novel Stackelberg
game-theoretic model. The underlying idea is to use advanced
information and communication infrastructures to involve carbon
cost in generators' objective function and formulate monetary
compensation for carbon reductions of consumers in specific
region and time period. The rationality of low carbon policy is
ensured through optimising overall economic and environmental
effects brought by the policy. Hence, a fair low carbon energy
market scheduling is realised through efficiently solving
interactions between leader and followers of Stackelberg game-
theoretic model by BL-MOIA. As illustrated by simulation,
considering the carbon cost in energy dispatch, the fuel is switched
from conventional sources to renewable energy sources. The
proposed low carbon energy market scheduling model promotes
31.45% of electricity generation from renewable energy sources.
The designed time and region-specific monetary compensation
scheme eliminates extreme high CEF of consumers, branches, and
carbon emission loss of branches, and contributes up to 26.41%
carbon mitigation caused by consumption behaviours. The
proposed model outperforms existing low carbon policy schemes
and energy market scheduling models in both leader and followers'
objective functions. Through the proposed model under the smart
grid environment, the responsibilities of carbon reductions are
allocated in overall energy market. In future work, the
environmental revenue of carbon tax from generators needs to be
reallocated in energy market, not only invest in low carbon
technologies but also compensate for energy intensive industries
due to the fear for competitiveness caused by carbon price. Thus,
how to fairly distribute this environmental revenue in specific
industry needs to be investigated.
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Fig. 12  Electricity generation by major sources and average carbon intensity for
(a) Benchmark, (b) Proposed model, (c) Existing model, (d) UK CPF. The x-axis denotes the time of day (h). The left-hand y-axis denotes the electricity generation mix by major
sources corresponding to the stacked area in the figure to reflect the composition and share of generation by each source, and the right-hand y-axis denotes the average carbon
intensity corresponding to the dashed blue line in the figure. The average carbon intensity is weighted by the power output of all generation sources
 
Table 2 Comparison of daily total values of objective
functions
Benchmark Proposed
model
Existing
model
CPF
payment bills, m£ 9.28 7.64 9.23 9.00
generating profits, m
£
3.62 6.50 6.05 4.49
social welfare, m£ — 4.51 2.91 1.13
carbon reductions,
kton
— 57.27 47.34 43.72
 
Fig. 13  Percentage of Electricity generation by major sources for
benchmark, proposed model, existing model, and the UK CPF. The
percentage is calculated based on aggregated one-year results in one-hour
interval. The sum of the percentage for each model is 100%
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